neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own. Lastly: this opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generations of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those a^apr^ara (as Aristotle calls them) those errors and bungles,

.which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed, by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it fcould dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubbornness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore, since neither all things are pro-'duced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanisto of matter, nor God himself may reasonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculously ; it may well be concluded, that there is a plastic nature under him, which, as an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, whieb consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as that there is also, besides this, a higher Providence to be acknowledged, which, presiding over